Speeding at 129 km/h in a City and Killing a Family of Three: Why Was the Sentence Death With Reprieve?
The short answer
- The conviction was for endangering public safety by dangerous means, not causing a traffic accident. The dividing line is the mental state: the former is intentional and, where death results, can carry the death penalty; the latter is negligent, with a basic maximum of three years’ imprisonment.
- The court’s post-judgment Q&A gave three reasons for death with reprieve rather than immediate execution: he did try to swerve after seeing the victims, showing indirect intent (“allowing” rather than “desiring” the result); he did not know the victims and had no dispute with them; and he called the police and waited at the scene, which amounts to voluntary surrender.
- Death with reprieve does not mean “out after two years”: if no intentional crime is committed during the reprieve, it is commuted to life imprisonment after two years; and the first-instance judgment is not yet final and must be approved by the high court.
- If the victims’ family disagrees, there are two routes: ask the procuratorate to protest within five days of receiving the judgment; and bring an incidental civil action for material losses.
- “How many people died” is not the test between the two crimes. Supreme People’s Court Guiding Case No. 268 (a drug-driving case) states that driving at high speed and repeatedly ramming while knowing it creates real danger shows intent to endanger public safety.
What happened
The following facts come from the Jingdezhen Intermediate People’s Court’s post-judgment Q&A and official state media reports, without reviewing the file.
At about 18:30 on 2 October 2024, the defendant Liao was driving an electric car along Changjiang Avenue in Jingdezhen. Waiting at a traffic-light junction, he argued with a passenger over trivial matters and became agitated; after waiting several red-light cycles he accelerated through and kept accelerating despite being urged to stop, then struck Hu (male, 31), Wang (female, 30) and the infant Hu (male, under 1) whom Hu was carrying, as they crossed the road. On seeing them he braked and steered to avoid them, but the speed was too high; all three died.
According to media reports, the road’s speed limit was 40 km/h, and prosecutors alleged he accelerated to 129 km/h. The characterisation of the case also shifted: he was first criminally detained on 3 October 2024 on suspicion of causing a traffic accident, then on 17 October his arrest was approved on suspicion of endangering public safety by dangerous means. On 9 January 2026 the first-instance judgment sentenced him to death with a two-year reprieve for endangering public safety by dangerous means. Afterwards the victims’ families said they did not accept it and would ask the procuratorate to protest.
Why not the traffic-accident offence?
In a sentence: the court found he “allowed” the deaths to happen — indirect intent — whereas causing a traffic accident requires negligence.
Article 133 of the Criminal Law: “Whoever violates traffic and transport regulations and thereby causes a major accident resulting in serious injury or death or heavy loss of public or private property shall be sentenced to up to three years’ imprisonment or criminal detention; where they flee after the accident or there are other especially egregious circumstances, to three to seven years; where fleeing results in death, to seven years or more.”
Article 114: “Whoever endangers public safety by arson, flooding, explosion, releasing poisonous, radioactive or infectious substances, or other dangerous means, without causing serious consequences, shall be sentenced to three to ten years’ imprisonment.”
Article 115(1): “Whoever by arson, flooding, explosion, releasing poisonous, radioactive or infectious substances, or other dangerous means causes serious injury, death or heavy loss of public or private property shall be sentenced to ten years or more, life imprisonment or death.”
(The following is my summary, not statutory text.) On consequences alone, either offence could apply; the watershed is the mental state and the nature of the conduct. The court’s test: first, whether the mental state was intentional or negligent; second, whether the conduct qualifies as “other dangerous means”. According to official reports, the court found that he knew Changjiang Avenue was a main city road packed with people and vehicles at the holiday evening rush, yet drove at grossly excessive speed and kept accelerating despite being urged to stop; from the moment he began speeding severely he was indifferent to public safety — indirect intent, not negligence — and his conduct created “an extremely high and uncontrollable real danger” to public safety, meeting the standard of “other dangerous means”. Conversely, accidents caused by speeding or distraction on ordinary roads, without continued acceleration or ignoring warnings, are usually still treated as causing a traffic accident (practical summary).
Supreme People’s Court Guiding Case No. 268, Yan, endangering public safety by dangerous means, published in February 2026, is even more explicit: knowing that driving after taking drugs creates real danger, yet driving at high speed and repeatedly ramming other vehicles or pedestrians, shows intent to endanger public safety. In that case the defendant didn’t stop to help after hitting people, sped away and rammed several vehicles, killing four, and was sentenced to immediate execution — under the same offence, whether the death penalty is applied depends on specific differences in circumstances, culpability and danger, not on “how many people died” (my summary).
How “indirect intent” and “surrender” were found
The court explained that the difference between direct and indirect intent is that the former “desires” the harmful result and the latter “allows” it. Liao did not know the victims and had no dispute with them, lacked any motive to seek their deaths, and tried to swerve on seeing them, so the court found indirect intent. On surrender, he called emergency services and the police after the crash and waited at the scene, meeting the requirement of voluntarily surrendering, and truthfully confessed the main facts once in custody; his argument that he was only guilty of causing a traffic accident was a defense on the legal characterisation and did not affect surrender.
Article 67(1) of the Criminal Law: “Voluntarily surrendering after committing a crime and truthfully confessing it constitutes surrender. Criminals who surrender may be given a lighter or mitigated punishment; where the crime is relatively minor, punishment may be exempted.”
(My summary) Surrender means “may” be lighter or mitigated, not “shall”; indirect intent only shows lower culpability than deliberate crime and doesn’t automatically avoid death. These two factors together with the “especially serious consequences” produced the sentence here.
What happens after a death sentence with reprieve
Article 48(1) of the Criminal Law: “The death penalty applies only to criminals who commit extremely serious crimes. For a criminal who should be sentenced to death but need not be executed immediately, a death sentence may be imposed with a two-year reprieve.”
Article 50(1): “Where a death sentence with reprieve is imposed, if the criminal commits no intentional crime during the reprieve, it shall be commuted to life imprisonment after two years; if they truly perform major meritorious service, to 25 years’ imprisonment after two years; if they commit an intentional crime with egregious circumstances, the death sentence shall be executed upon approval of the Supreme People’s Court; where an intentional crime is committed but the death penalty is not executed, the reprieve period restarts and is filed with the Supreme People’s Court.”
There is also an easily overlooked step: the first-instance judgment is not yet final. Article 248 of the Criminal Procedure Law: “Cases in which an intermediate people’s court imposes death with a two-year reprieve shall be approved by the high people’s court.” So this case still requires the high court’s approval.
What the victims’ families can still do
Article 229 of the Criminal Procedure Law: “A victim or their legal representative who disagrees with a first-instance judgment of a local people’s court has the right, within five days of receiving the judgment, to ask the people’s procuratorate to lodge a protest. The procuratorate shall decide within five days of receiving the request whether to protest and reply to the requester.” The deadline is five days from receipt of the judgment.
Article 101: “A victim who suffers material loss from the defendant’s crime has the right to bring an incidental civil action in the criminal proceedings. Where the victim has died or lost capacity, their legal representative or close relatives have the right to bring it.” Article 102 also allows the court, where necessary, to seal up, seize or freeze the defendant’s property, and the civil plaintiff may apply for preservation — for whether compensation is actually paid, this step often matters more than the figure in the judgment (my summary).
- Don’t treat a “letter of forgiveness” as a required step, and don’t believe that “paying compensation means no death sentence” or “refusing to forgive guarantees one” — forgiveness affects only sentencing, not the offence (my summary).
- If a family member has been charged and taken into custody, first establish the suspected offence and place of custody, then consider defense and bail — see A Family Member Is Criminally Detained in China: The Bail Mistakes 90% of Families Make.
Limitations
Facts come from the court’s post-judgment Q&A and official reports, without reviewing the file; provisions are from current texts; statements about how similar cases are usually handled are practical observations, not citable rules. The first-instance judgment is not yet final, and a protest, appeal or approval review may change the public picture. This article is not legal advice on any specific case.
Conclusion
The point worth remembering: the line between the two offences lies in the mental state — negligently killing someone while driving is causing a traffic accident, while knowingly allowing danger and continuing to drive at high speed and ram may fall under endangering public safety, with penalties an order of magnitude apart. And whether it was “negligence or allowing it” must ultimately be reconstructed from conduct, statements and vehicle data. If you or your family face such a case, contact Wang Xin: phone +86 186-0113-9509, WeChat wang223040.
Quick answers
- What is the difference between the traffic-accident crime and endangering public safety by dangerous means in China?
- The mental state. Causing a traffic accident (Art. 133) is negligent, with a maximum of 7 years (or more if a death results from fleeing). Endangering public safety by dangerous means (Arts. 114–115) is intentional, and causing death can carry the death penalty.
- Why did the Jingdezhen driver receive death with reprieve rather than immediate execution?
- The court cited indirect intent (allowing rather than desiring the result, shown by attempts to swerve), no prior relationship or dispute with the victims, and voluntary surrender after calling emergency services and waiting at the scene.
- What happens after a death sentence with two-year reprieve in China?
- If no intentional crime is committed during the two years, it is commuted to life imprisonment; with major meritorious service, to 25 years. A reprieve imposed by an intermediate court must be approved by the high court.
This is an English edition of Wang Xin’s original Chinese article, 市区飙到129公里撞死一家三口,为什么判的是死缓?. It explains the law of the People’s Republic of China in general terms and is not legal advice for any particular case; outcomes depend on the specific facts and on how local authorities apply the rules.
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